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I.

INTRODUCTION

become key tools for
achieving and maintaining commercial competitiveness, prudence demands that
strategic business plans anticipate the potential legal consequences of one's intended activity, and then manage this risk accordingly. While the wisdom of ordering legal rights through private contract has not been missing from the patent
world, the operation of patent assignments and licenses has come to the fore with a
public scrutiny of the U.S. patent system that is unprecedented in modern times.'
In this regard, much attention is being paid to the interplay between notions of the
freedom to contract and the arcane nature of the patent laws.
The U.S. Supreme Court has thankfully been engaged in this latest resurgence of
public awareness. 3 Indeed, an almost half-century of dormancy by the Court in
patent jurisprudence appears to have ended.' Moreover, the substantial deference
of the Supreme Court to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, since its
creation in 1982,' had led many to view the Federal Circuit as the court of last
IN AN AGE WHERE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS HAVE

1. See infra Parts II.-VII.; see also infra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text.
2. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principlesof Intellectual Property Law to
Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 309-10 (2008) ("[tjhe intermediate position adopted by various courts-i.e. between freedom of contract and federal patent policy-had
been a 'failure.'"); Frank J. Pita, ReconcilingReverse Engineering and Conflicting Shrinkwrap License Terms Under
U.C.C. Article 2B: A Patent Law Solution, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 465, 466 (1998)
(asking how to reconcile limited patent monopolies with the freedom to contract).
3. See infra Parts II., IV., VI.; see also infra note 5.
4. In the past two years, the Supreme Court has reviewed two-thirds as many patent appeals from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as it did in the first twenty-two years of the Federal Circuit's
existence. See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Ill. Tool Works
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006);
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc.,
529 U.S. 460 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998); Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996);
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661
(1990); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp.,
475 U.S. 809 (1986).
5. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) (outlining the jurisdiction of
the Federal Circuit). Congress established the Federal Circuit to bring about nationwide uniformity and to
improve judicial administration of the patent law. See S. REP. No. 97-275 (1981), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12.
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resort for patent matters.' Few would argue that the Supreme Court has taken

those reins back.'
With the renewed activity of the Court in the review of patent appeals, the jurisprudential dynamic of a conventional appellate process has been restored.' The
interpretation of Supreme Court guidance by the Federal Circuit and the U.S. district courts is once again a robust source of study.' Along these lines, this article
considers the Federal Circuit jurisprudence that has developed in the wake of three
recent Supreme Court decisions handed down in the past two years-namely eBay

Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,' 5 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.," and Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 2-in

an attempt to divine a future course for

the private ordering of patent rights. 3
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S CHANGE OF COURSE IN
FBAY INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE,

L.L. C,

On May 15, 2006, the Supreme Court in eBay vacated and remanded the Federal

Circuit's judgment reversing the district court's denial of MercExchange's request
for a permanent injunction against eBay and Half.com. 4 In eBay, the Court dismissed the notion that injunctive relief in patent law should be considered under a
different analysis than applicable in other legal disciplines. 5 In so holding, the
Court noted that
[a]ccordingto well-establishedprinciples of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such
6. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, PatentLaw in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387,
387-88 ("The Supreme Court has rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law. The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . has become the de facto supreme court of patents. In those rare
patent cases when the real Supreme Court has materialized, the Court has left behind a largely uninspiring
jurisprudence. When winnowed down to those cases dealing directly with substantive patent issues, the jurisprudence is paltry indeed.") (footnote omitted); Michael Paul Chu, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of
Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1351 (1992) ("The Federal Circuit is
effectively the court of last resort for patent appeals because very few patent cases reach the Supreme Court.").
7. But cf Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 765 (2008)
("Numbers alone, however, do not begin to capture the importance of the Supreme Court's present and future
role in the development of the patent law .... [T]here are several reasons why the role of the Supreme Court in
the future is likely to be pivotal.").
8. See Donald Steinberg & David Chavous, Supreme CourtReview of Patent Cases: What Will Follow eBay,
MedImmune, and KSR?, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 185, 207 (2008) (noting that the Supreme Court's renewed interest
in patent law cases may have drastic effects on the Federal Circuit's patent jurisprudence).
9. See, e.g., Dyk, supra note 7; Steinberg & Chavous, supra note 8.
10. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
11. 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
12. 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).
13. See infra Parts III., V., VII.
14. 547 U.S. at 394. The permanent injunction suit involved U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265, which related to
electronic markets designed to facilitate the online sales of goods. Id. at 390.
15. Id. at 391-92 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
100
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relief A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.16
Moreover, the Court reminded that the proper standard of review was for an abuse
of discretion by the district court, given the equitable nature of the decision to
grant or deny permanent injunctive relief. 7
The Court rejected both the district court's and Federal Circuit's rulings, finding
that neither court had faithfully applied these traditional equitable principles.' Although the district court had properly cited the traditional four-factor test, it went
too far in suggesting that injunctive relief should be denied in a wide range of cases
for which the Court would have found an injunction to be appropriate. 9 In particular, the Supreme Court was unwilling to accept the district court's sweeping conclusion "that a 'plaintiff's willingness to license its patents' and 'its lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents' would be sufficient to establish that
the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue."2' The Court mentioned that
some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors,
might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts
to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves.
Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the traditionalfour-factor test, and
[thus there is] no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do
21

SO.

The Court opined that the district court's categorical rule did not comport either
with Congress's intent to protect the principles of equity as they relate 22to patent law
or with prior Supreme Court precedent concerning injunctive relief.

In rejecting the ruling, the Court noted that the Federal Circuit had "departed in
the opposite direction from the four-factor test."23 Indeed, the Federal Circuit had
fashioned a general rule, only in patent cases, that once infringement and validity
had been found, an injunction should be denied "only in the unusual case, under
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
Id.
Id. (citing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422-30 (1908)).
Id.
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'
exceptional circumstances and in rare instances ... to protect the public interest."24
The Federal Circuit premised this general rule favoring permanent injunction on
the statutory right of a patent holder "to exclude others from making, using, offer'
ing for sale, or selling the invention."25
The Supreme Court, however, admonished
that "the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations
of that right."'
Where the district court had gone too far in its categorical denial of injunctive
relief, the Federal Circuit had gone too far in the opposite direction in its categorical grant of such relief. 7 In vacating the judgment of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court emphasized that a patent case should be treated like any other case
where the equitable discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief must be undertaken in light of the traditional principles of equity.2

III.

CHARTING A NEW COURSE ON MATTERS OF
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SINCE EBAY

In the two years since eBay, the Federal Circuit has had several occasions to consider the Supreme Court's guidance and chart a new course in considering the
merits of injunctive relief in the circumstances of various cases.29
A.

Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

On June 22, 2006, in Abbott Laboratoriesv. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,Inc.," ° the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's preliminary injunction for patent infringement. " In this first post-eBay decision, the Federal Circuit made only a scant
reference to the Supreme Court's decision a month earlier.3 2 The Federal Circuit,
nonetheless, noted the Supreme Court's admonition in eBay to apply the principles
of equity when considering injunctive relief and to give due deference to the equita-

24. Id. at 393-94 (citing MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id. at 392 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) and citing MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court also noted that the Patent Act explicitly gives patents the attributes of
property. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261).
26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 394.

28. Id. The Supreme Court did not, however, take a "position on whether permanent injunctive relief
should or should not issue in this particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes arising under the
Patent Act." Id.
29. See infra Parts III.A.-III.I.
30. 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
31. Id. at 1348. Abbott Laboratories sued Teva Pharmaceuticals for allegedly infringing U.S. Patents No.
6,010,718 and No. 6,551,616, which relate to the extended release clarithromycin formulation that Abbott
markets as Biaxin XL®. Id. at 1332.
32. See id. at 1334, 1347 (citing eBay only twice).
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ble discretion of the district court." Ultimately, however, the Federal Circuit held
that Abbott would not be able to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and
thus vacated the preliminary injunction. 4
B.

Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.

On April 12, 2007, in Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,3 the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment that Stryker willfully infringed an Acumed patent, but
vacated and remanded in light of eBay 6 The district court had ruled before the
eBay Court struck down the Federal Circuit's rule on injunctive relief in patent
cases in favor of the traditional four-factor equity test." Acumed's argument on
appeal was that "the facts found by the district court [could] serve as independent
support for the injunction, even without application of the old general rule."38
Mindful of its role as an appellate review authority, the Federal Circuit declined to
express a position on Acumed's argument, and instead vacated the injunction and
remanded with instructions to the district court to reconsider the four-factor test
as to whether or not an injunction should issue. 9

33. See id. at 1334, 1347-48; see also Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int'l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); Polymer
Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, H.A., 103 F.3d 970, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
34. See Abbott Labs., 452 F.3d at 1347-48. Teva did not challenge the claim that its generic formulation
infringed Abbott's '718 and '616 patents, but rather, asserted that those patents were "invalid for obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103." Id. at 1333. Relying on pre-eBay jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit reminded that the
accused infringer's burden of proving invalidity in the context of a preliminary injunction motion differed
significantly from that at trial. Id. at 1335 (citing Aniazon.con, 239 F.3d at 1358). To defeat the preliminary
injunction motion, the accused infringer would need only to raise a substantial question of invalidity. Id. By
contrast, at trial, the accused infringer would need to prove invalidity based upon clear and convincing evidence. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that the prior art, especially Abbott's '190 patent, contradicted the district
court's conclusion that Teva had not raised a substantial question that a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have had a reasonable expectation of success in making the claimed invention. Id. at 1342. Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit held that Abbott failed to "establish[ ] a likelihood of success on the merits," and thus
Abbott was "no longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm." Id. at 1347-48 (citing Reebok Int'l Ltd.
v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, the Federal Circuit did "not doubt that
generic competition [would] impact Abbott's sales of Biaxin XL®," but in the Federal Circuit's view, "that
alone (did] not establish that Abbott's harm would be irreparable." Id. at 1348; see also Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v.
Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that if the Federal Circuit were to accept a patentee's
"argu[ments] that, apart from the presumption, its potential lost sales alone demonstrate manifest irreparable
harm, . . . acceptance of that position would require a finding of irreparable harm to every manufacturer/
patentee, regardless of circumstances") (internal quotation marks omitted).
35.

483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

36. Id. at 802. Acumed's patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,472,444, relates to an orthopedic nail for treating humeral fractures. Id.
37. Id. at 811 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006)). The Federal Circuit's general rule granted injunctive relief where infringement and validity had been found, absent exceptional
circumstances. Id.
38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 811-12.
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C. Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.
On September 26, 2007, in Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., the
Federal Circuit, inter alia, vacated the district court's injunction for one of Verizon's patents and affirmed its injunction for two other patents."
With respect to the '574 and '711 patents, Vonage had argued that "the district
court abused its discretion by issuing an unsupported injunction," notwithstanding
the district court's application of the traditional four-factor equity test mandated in
eBay.42 Vonage believed that the district court had "impermissibly based its finding
of irreparable harm on lost sales alone,"4' but the Federal Circuit recognized that
"the district court [had] found . . . 'several areas of (irreparable) harm,' and [that]
the record contain[ed] evidence of price erosion as well as lost opportunities to sell
other services to the lost customers."' In addition, Vonage argued that the injunction was unnecessary because "the reasonable royalty decided by the jury was sufficient to compensate Verizon's harm.'1' The Federal Circuit concluded that Vonage
failed to show "clear error in the district court's determination to award an injunction" and therefore, affirmed the injunction. 6
D. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.
On October 18, 2007, in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.,4 7 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment that Toyota infringed U.S. Patent No.
5,343,970, which relates to drive trains for hybrid electric vehicles.48 The Federal
Circuit, however, vacated and remanded the award of "an ongoing royalty of $25
per ...Prius II, Toyota Highlander, or Lexus RX400h" sold by Toyota during the
remaining life of the '970 patent. 49 This case began a trend in the post-eBay era,
0
continued in Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories"
and Amado v. Microsoft

40. 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
41. Id. at 1298. The three patents-U.S. Patents No. 6,282,574; No. 6,104,711; and No. 6,359,880-relate
to a server for enhanced name translation that can be useful in implementing an Internet telephone system. Id.
The Federal Circuit also vacated a $58 million damages award and a 5.5% royalty on future infringing sales,
remanding for further proceedings. Id.
42.
43.

Id. at 1310.
Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, H.A., 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that
under certain circumstances "it may be reasonable to expect that invasion of the patent right can be recompensed with a royalty rather than with an injunction").
46.

Verizon Servs., 503 F.3d at 1311.

47.

504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

48.

Id. at 1316.

49.

Id. at 1314.

50.

512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Corp.,5 to reject permanent injunctions in favor of an ongoing royalty damages
award.52
The Federal Circuit sought to distinguish its ongoing royalty remedy from a
compulsory license."3 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that 35 U.S.C. § 283 "limits the scope of activities that may be enjoined." 4 But the Federal Circuit also recognized that "[u]nder some circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent
infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate."" The district court had
applied the eBay traditional four-factor equity test, declined to issue a permanent
injunction, and "imposed an ongoing royalty sua sponte upon the parties." 6 Because "the district court's order provide[d] no reasoning to support the selection of
$25 per infringing vehicle as the royalty rate, [the Federal Circuit was] unable to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion in setting the ongoing
royalty rate." 7 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that it would be "prudent to remand the case for the limited purpose of having the district court
reevaluate the ongoing royalty rate.""
51. 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52. See infra Parts lIl.E., lIi.G. The Federal Circuit in Paice thus addressed whether a district court order
enabling the "use of a patented invention in exchange for a royalty may be properly characterized as preventing
the violation of the rights secured by the patent." 504 F.3d at 1314 (emphasis omitted). The Federal Circuit, as
a procedural matter, also "address[ed] Paice's argument that it was entitled to a jury trial to determine the
amount of the ongoing royalty rate." Id. at 1315. While "Paice [might] be correct as a general matter," the
Federal Circuit reiterated that "not all monetary relief is properly characterized as 'damages,'" and concluded
that "the fact that monetary relief was at issue in this case [did] not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial." Id. at
1316.
53. Paice, 504 F.3d at 1313 n.13. According to the Federal Circuit, "'compulsory license' implies that
anyone who meets certain criteria has congressional authority to use that which is licensed." Id. The Federal
Circuit explained that "[bjy contrast, the ongoing-royalty order at issue here [was] limited to one particular set
of defendants [and] there [was] no implied authority in the [district] court's order for any other auto manufacturer to follow in Toyota's footsteps and use the patented invention with [judicial] imprimatur." Id.
54. Id. at 1314 (citing Joy Techs. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
55. Id.; see also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("[W]e do not find the amount of the royalty or its method of measurement to be clearly erroneous or an
abuse of judicial discretion."). The Federal Circuit in Paice noted that "[iun the context of an antitrust violation,
'mandatory sales and reasonable-royalty licensing' of relevant patents are 'well-established forms of relief when
necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed
to the antitrust violation adjudicated."' 504 F.3d at 1314 (quoting United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S.
52, 59 (1973)). But the Federal Circuit appreciated that "awarding an ongoing royalty where 'necessary' to
effectuate a remedy, [whether for] antitrust violations or patent infringement, does not justify the provision of
such relief as a matter of course whenever a permanent injunction is not imposed." Id. at 1314-15.
56. Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315. The Federal Circuit advised that "where the district court determines that a
permanent injunction is not warranted, the district court may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a license[ I
regarding future use of a patented invention before imposing an ongoing royalty." Id. The Federal Circuit
further recommended that if the parties "fail to come to an agreement, the district court [may] step in to assess
a reasonable royalty in light of the ongoing infringement." Id.
57. Id.; see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) ("It [is] important ... for the district court
to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.").
58. Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315. The Federal Circuit instructed that on remand, the district court could "take
additional evidence if necessary to account for any additional economic factors arising out of the imposition of
an ongoing royalty." Id. The Federal Circuit also indicated that the district court "should... take the opportunity ... to consider the concerns Paice raiseld] about the terms of Toyota's permissive continuing use." Id.
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E.

Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories

On January 17, 2008, in Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Laboratories,9 the Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded the district
court's judgment that Abbott infringed Innogenetics's U.S. Patent No. 5,846,704.6'

Abbott argued "that the district court.., erred in... finding that Innogenetics had
been irreparably harmed and was not adequately remedied by the $7 million award
of damages for Abbott's infringement." ' The Federal Circuit agreed with Abbott
that the market entry fee was based upon future sales by Abbott, and therefore,
Innogenetics could not complain that it would be irreparably harmed by future
sales.62 Holding that the district court abused its discretion, the Federal Circuit
vacated the injunction prohibiting future sales and remanded for a specification of
the terms of a compulsory license for a running royalty on future sales.63
F. Erico International Corp. v. Vutec Corp.
On February 19, 2008, in Erico International Corp. v. Vutec Corp.,64 the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining Doc's Marketing Corp. ("DMC") and other defendants from infringing U.S. Patent No.
5,740,994.6" Whereas Erico needed to show a likelihood that DMC infringed a valid
claim of the '994 patent, DMC needed to show a "substantial question of invalidity
to avoid a showing of likelihood of success."6 DMC, however, was not required to
prove actual invalidity, but only needed to show that the claims at issue were vulnerable.67 The Federal Circuit concluded that the "[DMC] invalidity challenge

59. 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
60. Id. at 1368. The patent relates to a method of genotyping hepatitis C virus ("HCV") based on genetic
sequences that can be found in the 5 prime untranslated region of the HCV genome. Id.
61. Id. at 1379. Abbott argued that "because the jury included a market entry fee of $5.8 million in its
calculation of damages, Innogenetics ha[d] been fully compensated for both Abbott's past infringement and
possible future sales of its accused products." Id.
62. Id. at 1380. Indeed, the Federal Circuit found it "hard to believe that a hypothetical negotiation between Innogenetics and Abbott would result in a royalty of $7 million that included a market entry fee of $5.8
million to sell licensed products for a three year period only, Abbott's total revenue during the period of
infringement was just $13 million." Id. at 1380 n.7 (citing State Contr. & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc.,
346 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
63. Id. at 1380-81.
64. 516 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 1352. Erico's patent relates to electrical and communications cable fasteners. Id.
66. Id. at 1354. DMC "asserted that Claim 17 [was] invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 because the combination of a prior art J-Hook with the methodology outlined in Claim 17 would have been obvious." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Erico Int'l Corp. v. Doc's Mktg., Inc., No. 1:05cv2924, 2006 WL 1174259, at
*4 (N.D. Ohio May 3, 2006)).
67. Id. at 1356. The Federal Circuit explained that "[vlalidity challenges during preliminary injunction
proceedings ... may raise substantial questions of invalidity, on evidence that would not suffice to support a
judgment of invalidity at trial." Id. at 1355-56 (quoting Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239
F.3d 1343, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, a showing of a substantial question of invalidity requires less proof than the clear and convincing standard to show actual invalidity." Id. at
1356.
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based on obviousness cast enough doubt on the validity of [the patent claim] to
negate likelihood of success on the merits as to infringement of a valid patent."'
G.

Amado v. Microsoft Corp.

On February 26, 2008, in Amado v. Microsoft Corp.,69 the Federal Circuit, inter alia,
affirmed the district court's dissolution of its prior permanent injunction against
Microsoft for infringing U.S. Patent No. 5,293,615, but vacated and remanded the
"award of $0.12 per infringing unit sold during the stay of the injunction." '70
"Microsoft argue[d] that the district court was entitled to award Amado no more
than $0.04 per infringing unit, the amount the jury found to be a reasonable royalty," but the Federal Circuit disagreed, explaining that "the jury's award of $0.04
per unit was based on Microsoft's infringing conduct that took place prior to the
verdict." 7 The Federal Circuit ruled that "the district court's escrow award of a
$0.12 post-verdict royalty did not expressly consider that Microsoft's infringing
sales took place following the grant of an injunction that was stayed," and remanded for reconsideration on that point."

68. Id. at 1357. The Federal Circuit concluded that DMC presented sufficient evidence to mount "a serious
challenge to the validity of Claim 17" of the '994 patent. Id. at 1356. The Federal Circuit emphasized that "at
this point ....
[DMCJ ha[d] only cast doubt on the validity of the '994 patent," and the district court would
"have the opportunity to reach a final validity determination at trial." Id.
69.

517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
70. Id. at 1356. Amado's patent relates to software programs with combined spreadsheet and database
functionalities. Id.
71. Id. at 1361. There was, according to the Federal Circuit,
a fundamental difference, however, between a reasonable royalty for pre-verdict infringement and
damages for post-verdict infringement ....
Prior to judgment, liability for infringement, as well as
the validity of the patent, is uncertain, and damages are determined in the context of that uncertainty. Once a judgment of validity and infringement has been entered, however, the calculus is
markedly different because different economic factors are involved .... Microsoft was enjoined from
further infringing activity yet was permitted to continue only by virtue, and with the imprimatur, of
the court-ordered stay.
Id. at 1361-62 (emphasis omitted) (citing Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Rader, J., concurring) ("[P]re-suit and post-judgment acts of infringement are distinct, and may warrant different royalty rates given the change in the parties' legal relationship and other factors.")).
72.

Id. at 1362. According to the Federal Circuit,
[Wihen a district court concludes that an injunction is warranted, but is persuaded to stay the
injunction pending an appeal, the assessment of damages for infringements taking place after the
injunction should take into account the change in the parties' bargaining positions, and the resulting
change in economic circumstances, resulting from the determination of liability-for example, the
infringer's likelihood of success on appeal, the infringer's ability to immediately comply with the
injunction, the parties' reasonable expectations if the stay was entered by consent or stipulation,
etc-as well as the evidence and arguments found material to the granting of the injunction and the
stay.

Id.
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H.

Voda v. Cordis Corp.

On August 18, 2008, in Voda v. Cordis Corp.," the Federal Circuit, inter alia, af-

firmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the district court's judgment that Cordis infringed Voda's patents, affirmed the denial of a permanent injunction, and vacated
and remanded a ruling of willfulness." The Federal Circuit rejected Voda's contention that "the district court erred in adopting a categorical rule that precludes a

patent owner from proving its entitlement to an injunction by showing irreparable
harm to its exclusive licensee."" Concluding that "the district court did not . ..
abuse its discretion in finding that monetary damages were adequate to compensate Voda," the Federal Circuit affirmed "the district court's denial of Voda's request

for a permanent injunction.
L

'

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.

On September 24, 2008, in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.," the Federal Circuit,
inter alia, affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the district court's judgment that
Qualcomm infringed U.S. Patents No. 6,847,686, No. 5,657,317, and No.
6,389,010.78 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that "[i]t remain[ed] an open question 'whether there remains a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm following eBay,'" 79 but held that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
irreparable injury here" because Broadcom provided evidence of irreparable harm
despite not currently practicing the claimed inventions." The Federal Circuit also
"agree[d] with Broadcom that the district court did not abuse its discretion ... in
.. finding[ ] that the structural nature of a design win market favors a finding that
monetary damages [were] inadequate." ' 1

73. 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
74. Id. at 1315. Voda's patents-U.S. Patents No. 5,445,625; No. 6,083,213; and No. 6,475,195-all relate
to cardiac guide catheters. Id.
75. Id. at 1329. The Federal Circuit opined that "[nlothing in eBay eliminate[d] the requirement that the
party seeking a permanent injunction must show that 'it ha[d] suffered an irreparable injury.'" Id. (citing eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006)).
76. Id.
77. 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
78. Id. at 686. Broadcom's three patents relate to third generation baseband processor chips used in cellular telephones. Id.
79. Id. at 702 (quoting Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
80. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected Qualcomm's argument "that because Broadcom [did] not sell or plan
to sell CDMA2000 chips, it [could not] allege harm resulting from Qualcomm's CDMA2000 chip sales," finding that "Broadcom's arguments ... amount[ed] to no more than speculative, unsubstantiated assertions of
harm." Id.
81. Id. at 703 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Qualcomm relie[d] primarily on
[Broadcom's license agreement with Verizon] as evidence that Broadcom [could] be adequately compensated
by monetary damages." Id. Broadcom had a "general policy of not licensing its patents," and thus, argued that
"harm ... would ensue from a compulsory license to its most significant competitor." Id. at 702. Broadcom
explained that "it entered into a license agreement with Verizon, in part, to minimize the potential impact of an
injunction to third parties or consumers while Qualcomm design[ed] around Broadcom's patents." Id.
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I. Post-eBay Elimination of Presumptive Grants of Injunctive Relief
The Federal Circuit jurisprudence since eBay regarding injunctive relief has been
faithful to the elimination of any presumptive grant of injunctive relief for a prevailing patent plaintiff. 2 While the effect of eBay on non-practicing patent owners,
including patent trolls, will continue to play out in the years to come, the number
of contingency fee patent infringement cases appears anecdotally to have suffered a
85
sharp decline post-eBay.
In any event, prevailing patent plaintiffs in the post-eBay
era have already begun to seek prospective damages under the guise of injunctive
relief in the form of post-infringement verdict royalties that arguably amount to a
compulsory license.84
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT'S RENEWED FOCUS ON FORUM AND
JURISDICTION IN MEDIMMUNE

INC. V. GENENTECH, INC.

5

In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Federal Circuit's decision upholding the district court's dismissal of
MedImmune's declaratory judgment suit. 6 MedImmune asserted that U.S. Patent
No. 6,331,415 (Cabilly II), which related to human antibody production, was invalid and unenforceable, notwithstanding MedImmune's continued payment (albeit
under protest) of royalties for its product Synagis® under a license to the '415
patent.87 The Court noted that "[t] he Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, '[i]n
a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States

...may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.'"88
The Court acknowledged that its jurisprudence lacked clear guidance about
whether a declaratory-judgment action satisfied the case-or-controversy.89 Indeed,
the Court has
82. See Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory License: FacilitatingLicense Negotiation for Efficient PostVerdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 427, 432 (2008) ("Since eBay, the Federal Circuit has
reviewed four trial court decisions regarding the permanent injunctions in a patent infringement case. All four
were remanded because the trial court had granted the injunction without applying the four-factor test required by eBay.").
83. See Michael H. Baniak et al., IP Litigation in the 21st Century, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 293, 305
(2008) ("With Ebay [sic], essentially, if you don't manufacture, you are not going to get an injunction. So that's
gone. That's disappeared. So the big hammer that a patent litigant had is disappearing in the contingency world
for all intensive [sic] purposes.").
84. See George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a Post-eBay World, 4
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 549, 569 (2008) ("Some courts have awarded future infringement damages. Some courts
have done nothing, requiring the patentee to initiate new litigation to collect damages for future infringement.
Finally, some courts have imposed a compulsory license.") (internal citations omitted).
85. 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
86. Id. at 137.
87. Id. at 121-22.
88. Id. at 126 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000)).
89. Id. at 127.
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required that the dispute be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests; and that it be real and substantialand
admi(t) of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character,as distinguishedfrom an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
90
state of facts.
The Court has attempted to explain the test as whether the evidence showed "that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment."9'
In MedImmune, a substantial controversy clearly would have existed if MedImmune had simply stopped paying royalties based on its assertion that the Cabilly II
patent was invalid and not infringed.92 The twist in this case, therefore, was the fact
that MedImmune's continued performance under the license in paying royalties
essentially eliminated any imminent threat of an infringement suit by Genentech,
and thus raised the question whether an Article III case or controversy existed
here.93
"[W]here threatened action by government is concerned, [the Court] do[es] not
require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the
basis for the threat-for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be
enforced." 4 The Court opined that "[t]he plaintiffs own action (or inaction) in
failing to violate the law eliminate[d] the imminent threat of prosecution, but
nonetheless [did] not eliminate Article III jurisdiction."95 In the Court's view, the
action or inaction "did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction because the threateliminating behavior was effectively coerced." The Court concluded that "[t]he
dilemma posed by that coercion-putting the challenger to the choice between
abandoning his rights or risking prosecution-[was] 'a dilemma that it was the
very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.'"'
"Promising to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid [did] not
amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their invalidity." ' Genentech "appeal[ed] to the common-law rule that a party to a contract cannot at one and the

90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41
(1937)).
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273
(1941)).

92. Id. at 128. Of course, Genentech claimed a right to royalties under the license and would have enjoined
MedImmune's activities if such royalty payments stopped. Id.
93. Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at 128-29 (emphasis omitted).
95. Id. at 129.
96.

Id.

97.
98.

Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1987)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 135 (emphasis omitted).
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same time challenge its validity and continue to reap its benefits."99' But the Court
did not see MedImmune as "repudiating or impugning the contract while continuing to reap its benefits. Rather, [MedImmune] assert[ed] that the contract, properly interpreted, [did] not prevent it from challenging the patents, and [did] not
require the payment of royalties because the patents [did] not cover its products
and [were] invalid."'' °
V.

PLACING GREATER EMPHASIS ON FORUM AND
JURISDICTION POST-MEDIMMUNE

In pre-Medlmmune patent disputes, the Federal Circuit had
articulateda two-part test that first consider[ed] whether conduct by the patentee create[d] a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratoryjudgment plaintiff that it [would] face an infringement suit, and second
examine[d] whether conduct by the declaratoryjudgment plaintiffamount[ed]
to infringing activity or demonstrate[d] concrete steps taken with the intent to
conduct such activity.'0
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the MedImmune decision represented a rejection of the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of suit test. 2 Since
MedImmune, the Federal Circuit has issued almost a dozen decisions regarding the
propriety of declaratory judgment jurisdiction." 3
A.

SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.

On March 26, 2007, in SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., °4 the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal of SanDisk's suit seeking a
declaration of noninfringement of ST flash memory storage patents.' 5 The Federal
Circuit reasoned that it "need not define the outer boundaries of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of each case." 0 6 The
99. Id. (citing Commodity Credit Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros. & Co., 243 F.2d 504, 512 (9th Cir. 1957);
Kingman & Co. v. Stoddard, 85 F. 740, 745 (7th Cir. 1898)).
100. Id.
101. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also infra Part
V.A.
102. SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1380; see also infra Part V.A.
103. See infra Parts V.A.-V.K.
104. 480 F.3d 1372.
105. Id. at 1374.
106. Id. at 1381. The Federal Circuit narrowly held that
where a patentee assert[ed] rights under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned
activity of another party, and where that party contend[ed] that it [had] the right to engage in the
accused activity without license, an Article III
case or controversy [would] arise and the party need
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Federal Circuit determined that "SanDisk ha[d] established an Article III case or
controversy that [gave] rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction."'' 7
B.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.

On March 30, 2007, in Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Corp.,' ° the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Teva's suit

seeking a declaration that its generic Famvir® did not infringe several of Novartis's
famciclovir patents.0 9 The Federal Circuit stated that, "under 'all the circumstances'
as found in this case, Teva ha[d] an injury-in-fact and therefore ha[d] a justiciable
Article III controversy.""' While the Federal Circuit acknowledged "that several of
Teva's grounds alleging an 'actual controversy' when standing alone might not be
sufficient," it opined that "if taken as a whole[,] these circumstances establish[ed] a
justiciable controversy with Novartis that [could] be resolved by allowing Teva to
bring a declaratory judgment."'

C. Honeywell International Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.
On May 25, 2007, in Honeywell International Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems

Corp.," 2 the Federal Circuit, inter alia, reversed and remanded the district court's
summary judgment that Universal and Sandel did not infringe U.S. Patents No.3
5,839,080, No. 6,092,009, No. 6,122,570, No. 6,138,060, and No. 6,219,592."

"Honeywell argue[d] that the district court erred by exercising jurisdiction over the
not risk a suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of
its legal rights.

Id.
107. Id. at 1382. In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that,
as part of the "license negotiations," ... [ST's] seasoned litigation experts ... [provided] a detailed
presentation which identified, on an element-by-element basis, the manner in which ST believed
each of SanDisk's products infringed the specific claims of each of ST's patents[,l . .. [as well as] a
packet of materials, over 300 pages in length, containing, for each of ST's fourteen patents under
discussion, a copy of the patent, reverse engineering reports for certain of SanDisk's products, and
diagrams showing a detailed infringement analysis of SanDisk's products.
Id.
108. 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
109. Id. at 1334, 1346. The allegedly infringed patents were U.S. Patents No. 5,246,937; No. 5,840,763; No.
5,866,581; No. 5,916,893; and No. 6,124,304. Id. at 1334.
110. Id. at 1340. The Federal Circuit rejected Novartis's argument "that there [was] no actual controversy
between it and Teva on the four method patents ...because Novartis ha[d] not filed suit nor threatened to sue
Teva on the method patents." Id. The Federal Circuit concluded,
while Teva's declaratory judgment action and the pending '937 suit [were] different "cases," they
[arose] from the same controversy created when Novartis listed its Famvir® patents in the Orange
Book, Teva submitted its ANDA certifying all five Famvir® patents under paragraph IV, and Novartis
sued Teva challenging the submission of Teva's ANDA.
Id. According to the Federal Circuit, "Novartis ha[d] the right of an immediate action at any time against Teva
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) on any or all of the remaining Famvir@ Orange Book patents." Id. at 1341.
111. Id.
112. 488 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
113. Id. at 987. Honeywell's patents relate to virtual look ahead terrain warning avionics. Id. at 987-88.
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defendants' request for declaratory relief on the withdrawn claims of the '009 and
'060 patents.1 . 4 Because "infringement of a dependent claim also entails infringement of its associated independent claim," the Federal Circuit "affirm[ed] the district court's decision to retain jurisdiction over the withdrawn claims of the '060
and '009 patents."''
D.

Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.

On July 20, 2007, in Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.," 6 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Nucleonics' declaratory judgment counterclaims in a case where Benitec had sued Nucleonics for infringing U.S. Patent No.
6,573,099, which related to RNA interference (RNAi) gene silencing therapy." 7 The
Federal Circuit emphasized that "the party claiming declaratory judgment jurisdiction" bears the burden of establishing "that such jurisdiction existed at the time the
claim for declaratory relief was filed and that it has continued since."" The Federal
Circuit held that "Nucleonics ha[d] therefore not met its burden of showing...
that its discussions regarding expansion into animal husbandry and veterinary
products" constituted present activity, which could subject it to a claim of infringement by Benitec that would satisfy the immediacy and reality requirement for declaratory judgment jurisdiction." 9 The Federal Circuit also held that Nucleonics

114. Id. at 995. Honeywell had
represented to Universal and Sandel that it would not pursue infringement of these previously asserted claims of the '009 and '060 patents. Based on this representation, Honeywell attempted to
withdraw all of the originally asserted display claims, except claims 27-33 of the '009 patent and
claims 4-5 of the '060 patent. The district court determined that Honeywell's refusal to withdraw all
of the claims in the display patents left the defendants with a reasonable apprehension of suit. As
such, the district court maintained jurisdiction over the claims Honeywell sought to withdraw. Ultimately the district court found [these patent claims] invalid ....
Id.
115. Id. at 996. "When Honeywell withdrew some independent claims from the litigation, it also chose to
maintain causes of action based on certain dependent claims relating to its display technology." Id. at 995.
Furthermore, "Honeywell ha[d] also charged Sandel with infringement of the display patents in another lawsuit." Id. at 996.
116. 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2055 (2008).
117. Id. at 1341-42.
118. Id. at 1344 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974); Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase
Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Int'l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc. v. Gore
Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
119. Id. at 1348 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). The Federal Circuit
reported that "Nucleonics [was] currently researching applications of RNAi with an eye to treating human
diseases, such as hepatitis B." Id. at 1346. Both parties
[took] the position that Nucleonics's present activities related to the human medical application of
RNAi [were], in light of [35 U.S.C.] § 271 and the Supreme Court's decision in Merck, [were] not
infringing and [could not] become infringing until after Nucleonics filed a new drug application
("NDA") with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").
Id. "The fact that Nucleonics may file an NDA in a few years [did] not provide the immediacy and reality
required for a declaratory judgment[,J" the Federal Circuit reasoned. Id.
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had similarly failed to show that its future plans met the immediacy and reality
requirement of Medlmmune necessary to support a justiciable controversy. 2 °
E. Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd.
On August 3, 2007, in Sony Electronics, Inc. v. GuardianMedia Technologies, Ltd.,'
the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' suit seeking a declaration that U.S.
Patents No. 4,930,158 and No. 4,930,160 were not infringed, and were invalid and
unenforceable due to laches and equitable estoppel.12 The Federal Circuit "reject[ed] Guardian's suggestion that there can be no jurisdiction in the courts because it was at all times willing to negotiate a 'business resolution' to the
dispute.' ' 2 3 The Federal Circuit also rejected Guardian's assertion that even if an
actual controversy existed,
the district court's dismissals should be affirmed on dis4
cretionary grounds.1

F. Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc.
On September 19, 2007, in Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 25 the Federal Circuit,
inter alia, affirmed the district court's judgment entering the jury verdict that U.S.
Patent No. 6,257,883, which relates to orthodontic brackets, was invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b). 26 The Federal Circuit "conclude[d] that Adenta established an Ar-27
ticle III case or controversy that gave rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction.'
120. Id. at 1349 (citing MedImmune, 518 U.S. at 127). The Federal Circuit expressed no opinion on whether
Nucleonics's prospective animal RNAi products "could ever be the subject of an infringement suit," but concluded only that there was currently "no 'substantial controversy[ I'between (Benitec and Nucleonics) ...
[a]nd there may never be." Id. (citing MedImmune, 518 U.S. at 127).
121. 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
122. Id. at 1273.
123. Id. at 1286. The Federal Circuit reasoned that "even if the parties' interactions in this case could be
characterized as 'negotiations,' Sony was within its rights to terminate them when it determined that further
negotiations would be unproductive. Although Guardian may have wanted to negotiate with Sony, Sony was
not required to negotiate with Guardian." Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). "[Blecause Guardian assert[ed] that it [was]
owed royalties based on specific past and ongoing activities by Sony, and because Sony contend[ed] that it
ha[d] a right to engage in those activities without a license," the Federal Circuit found "an actual controversy
between the parties." Id. (citing SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381).
124. Id. at 1287. In the Federal Circuit's view,
there [was] no affirmative evidence to suggest that [Sony] filed this suit [solely] to obtain a more
favorable bargaining position in any ongoing license negotiations. In addition, while this litigation
may have had the effect of weakening Guardian's bargaining position relative to third parties, [the
Federal Circuit did] not think it appropriate to infer that [Sony], therefore, filed this suit as an
intimidation tactic to gain leverage in any future negotiations with Guardian.
Id. at 1289.
125. 501 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
126. Id. at 1366. The Federal Circuit "agree[d] with Adenta that substantial evidence existed in the record to
support the jury's verdict that a Time bracket was publicly used or on sale at the 1994 Florida trade show." Id.
at 1371.
127. Id. at 1370. As the Federal Circuit explained,
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Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that "the failure of [patentee] American to file
an infringement counterclaim in response to the declaratory judgment action did
not deprive the court of jurisdiction."' 28
G.

Micron Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc.

On February 29, 2008, in Micron Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc.,'29
the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the decision of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, which had dismissed, on jurisdictional
grounds, Micron's suit seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement of fourteen U.S. patents that related to dynamic random access memory chips. 3 ° Micron
had sought to have the declaratory judgment action transferred to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, where related litigation was pending.' The
Federal Circuit ruled that the California district court had declaratory judgment
jurisdiction and the case should be heard by the California court, rather than by
deferring to the Texas forum of the later-filed suit.'32 The Federal Circuit reasoned
that "in cases such as this with competing forum interests, the trial court needs to
consider the 'convenience factors' found in a transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a)."' 33 The Federal Circuit determined that the California "district court's
grounds for declining to exercise jurisdiction were not sufficient."' 4 The Federal
Adenta advised American that it believed the '883 patent was invalid and that it would not pay any
further royalties .... American responded [by] indicating that if Adenta breached its license ... by
not paying royalties, it would 'pursue its available legal remedies.' Thus, American indicated its intent
to assert its rights under the '883 patent in the event that Adenta failed to pay royalties under the
terms of the [Ilicense[ 1,thereby creating a substantial controversy.
Id.
128. Id. (citing Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
129. 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
130. Id. at 899-90.
131. Id. at 905.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 902-03. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a) (2000). The Federal Circuit reasoned that "[wihether intended or not, the now more lenient legal
standard" set forth in MedInin une"facilitateId] or enhance[d] the availability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases." Micron, 518 F.3d at 902 (citing Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs. Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). "The resulting ease of achieving declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases ... could
[facilitate] a forum-seeking race to the courthouse between accused infringers and patent holders." Id.
134. Micron, 518 F.3d at 903. "The general rule [in transfer cases] favors the forum of the first-filed action,
whether or not it is a declaratory judgment action." Id. at 904 (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998
F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). "A district court may consider a party's intention to preempt another's infringement suit when ruling on the dismissal of a declaratory action, but that consideration is merely one
factor in the analysis." Id. (citing Genentech, 998 F.2d at 937). The Federal Circuit noted that
[Wlhen the discretionary determination is presented after the filing of an infringement action, the
jurisdiction question is treated basically the same as a transfer action under § 1404(a)[,] [and] ...
[tihe convenience and availability of witnesses, absence of jurisdiction over all necessary or desirable
parties, possibility of consolidation with related litigation, land] considerations relating to the interest of justice must be evaluated to ensure the case receives attention in the most appropriate forum.
Id. at 904-05.
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Circuit concluded that a consideration of the section 1404 convenience factors revealed that the California district court was the more appropriate forum for the
dispute between Micron and MOSAID.3 5
H. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.
On April 1, 2008, Caraco PharmaceuticalLaboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories,
Inc.,' 6 the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal for
lack of standing in Caraco's declaratory judgment suit for noninfringement of U.S.
Patent No. 6,916,941 by its generic drug to treat depression and general anxiety
disorder.' 7 Caraco had filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with a
Paragraph IV certification regarding the '941 patent and U.S. Patent No. RE 34,712,
both of which related to escitalopram that Forest marketed as Lexapro®."' The
Federal Circuit held that Caraco's allegation "that it ha[d] been 'restrain[ed from]
the free exploitation of non-infringing goods,'" was sufficient to establish Article III
standing.'39 The Federal Circuit noted that Caraco's injury was also "fairly traceable" to Forest's conduct, which also satisfied the causation requirement of Article
III standing. 4 ° The Federal Circuit also determined that "Caraco's injury-in-fact
14
[was] redressible by a declaratory judgment that the '941 patent is not infringed." '
135. Id. at 905.
Both Micron and MOSAID [did] business both in California and Texas, so this [factor did] not weigh
in favor of either forum. Also, the record [did] not show that availability of witnesses or jurisdiction
over desirable parties favor[ed] Texas over California. While the well-known patent forum of the
Eastern District of Texas ha[d] heard cases involving some of the same patents, the record [did] not
show any ongoing litigation requiring consolidation.
Id.
136. 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
137. Id. at 1282.
138. Id. at 1288.
139. Id. at 1292 (quoting Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1998)). Caraco alleged it was "being excluded from selling a non-infringing product because Forest ha[d] taken
actions [to] delay the FDA from approving Caraco's ANDA." Id. at 1291 (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The Federal Circuit reasoned that "[i]f Caraco
[was] correct that its generic drug [did] not infringe Forest's '941 patent, then it [had] a right to enter the
generic drug market, and its exclusion from the generic drug market by Forest's actions [was] a sufficient
Article III injury-in-fact." Id. at 1292.
140. Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998); Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-78 (1978)). The Federal Circuit found that "Forest's listing
of the '712 and '941 patents in the Orange-Book effectively denie[d] Caraco an economic opportunity to enter
the marketplace unless Caraco [could] obtain a judgment that both those patents [were] invalid or not infringed by its generic drug." Id. at 1292-93. Forest thus "create~d] an independent barrier to the drug market
that deprive[d] Caraco of an economic opportunity to compete." Id. at 1293. This conduct was sufficient to
satisfy the traceability requirement of Article III standing. Id. (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
141. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that "[i]fCaraco obtaine[d] a favorable judgment that the drug described
in its ANDA [did] not infringe Forest's '941 patent, then it [would] only need a judgment of invalidity or
noninfringement on Forest's '712 patent in order to activate Ivax's exclusivity period and obtain FDA approval"
forthwith. Id.
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Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc.

On May 28, 2008, in Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc.,42 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment that TubeMaster did not infringe
U.S. Patent No. 6,905,660, which relates to a method for using loading devices to
place catalyst particles into multi-tube chemical reactors.'43 The Federal Circuit
held that "although a party need not have engaged in the actual manufacture or
sale of a potentially infringing product to obtain a declaratory judgment of noninfringement, there must be a showing of 'meaningful preparation' for making or
using that product."'44 The Federal Circuit found that the "[c] onstitutionally mandated immediacy requirements [had] been satisfied."' 45 In the Federal Circuit's
view, "[t]he dispute between TubeMaster and Cat Tech also [met] constitutionally
mandated 'reality' requirements."146 The Federal Circuit explained that "[e]vidence
that no preparations have been made to advertise or sell a potentially infringing
device may, under certain circumstances, indicate that a dispute lacks the requisite
immediacy."' 47 The Federal Circuit thus held that "the district court properly exer-

142.

528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

143. Id. at 874.
144. Id. at 881 (citing DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 62 F.3d 1397, 1401 (Fed. Cir.
1995); BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (requiring "present activity
which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity"); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955-56 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring that the plaintiff
"actually have either produced the device or have prepared to produce that device")). "In general, the greater
the length of time before potentially infringing activity is expected to occur, 'the more likely the case lacks the
requisite immediacy."' Id. (quoting Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 1361,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
145. Id. at 882. TubeMaster had "developed two basic loading device designs-one with circular plates and
one with circular plates with tabs-and [had] developed four loading device configurations." Id. at 881. The
Federal Circuit found that
TubeMaster [had] already successfully manufactured and delivered a loading device using configuration 3.... It [was] prepared to produce loading devices using configurations 1, 2 and 4 as soon as it
receive[d] an order with the appropriate dimensions. . . . Constitutionally mandated immediacy
requirements [had] been satisfied because once the threat of liability to Cat Tech . . . lifted, it appear[ed] likely that TubeMaster [could] expeditiously solicit and fill orders for loading devices using
configurations 1, 2 and 4.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
146. Id. "TubeMaster's four basic loading device designs [were] designed 'to cover virtually all of the reactor
configurations that might be encountered at customers' facilities.'" Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that
"[t]he dispute with Cat Tech [was] 'real,' not hypothetical, because it appear[ed] likely that, once the cloud of
liability for infringement [was] eliminated, the accused products [could] be produced without significant design change." Id. at 882-83 (citing Inderdynamics, Inc. v. Wolf, 698 F.2d 157, 169-74 (3d Cir. 1982)).
147. Id. at 883 (citing Sierra, 363 F.3d at 1379 (considering that there was no "existing or draft advertising
literature" for the device in question and determining the dispute non-justiciable); Lang v. Pac. Marine &
Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764-65 (Fed Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe accused infringers had not distributed sales literature, prepared to solicit orders, or engaged in any activity indicating that the ship would soon be ready for
sea."); Interdynamnics, 698 F.2d at 172 (finding justiciability although the plaintiff "had not yet advertised or
solicited orders for its proposed new product," because there was significant evidence that the plaintiff intended to manufacture it)).
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cised its discretion to issue
a declaratory judgment of non-infringement as to con148
figurations 1, 2 and 4.1
J. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp.
On August 15, 2008, in Prasco, LLC v. Medicis PharmaceuticalCorp.,49 the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Prasco's suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that Prasco's generic benzoyl peroxide cleansing product OSCIONM did
not infringe U.S. Patents No. 5,648,389, No. 5,254,334, No. 5,409,706, and No.
5,632,996, which relate to a benzoyl peroxide cleansing product marketed by
Medicis as TRIAZ®.' The Federal Circuit found that "Prasco [had] not alleged a
controversy of sufficient 'immediacy and reality' to create a justiciable
5

controversy. ' '

The Federal Circuit recognized that "Prasco [did] not allege that defendants had
Tm
at the time the supplemenactually restrained its right to freely market OSCION
tal complaint was filed, . . . [but that] it [was] the threat of future injury that
52
form[ed] the basis for Prasco's complaint."' The Federal Circuit disagreed with

Prasco's argument that "Medicis' past history of enforcing patent rights to protect
5 3
Lastly, the
its 'core products' support[ed] a finding of a case or controversy."'

148. Id. The Federal Circuit concluded that "[aibsent a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
TubeMaster [would] be forced to 'bet the farm' by making the 'in terrorem choice,' between a growing potential
liability to Cat Tech and abandoning its catalyst loading activities." Id. (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc.
v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). The Federal Circuit recognized that "this [was] precisely the type of 'dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.'" Id.
(quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007)) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
149. 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
150. Id. at 1333-34.
151. Id. at 1338. "Rather than a purely subjective fear or the mere existence of a potentially adverse patent
alone, the alleged injury at the root of most justiciable declaratory judgment controversies in the patent context
is a 'restraint on the free exploitation of non-infringing goods,' or an imminent threat of such restraint." Id. at
1339 (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). "A patentee can cause such an injury in a variety of ways, for example, by creating a reasonable apprehension of an
infringement suit, demanding the right to royalty payments, or creating a barrier to the regulatory approval of
a product that is necessary for marketing." Id. (internal citations omitted).
152. Id. Prasco had pointed to Medicis' marking of its products with the applicable patent numbers to serve
as notice to the public under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) that the goods are patented. Id. at 1340. The Federal Circuit
found that "Medicis' decision to mark its products with the applicable patents provid[ed] little, if any, evidence
that it will ever enforce its patents." Id. Specifically, in the Federal Circuit's view,
Medicis' decision to mark its products, prior to any knowledge of Prasco's OSCIONTM product, [was]
Tm
infring[ed] the applicable patirrelevant to the question of whether Medicis' believe[d] OSCION
ents or will attempt to interfere with Prasco's business on the basis of an allegation of infringement.
Thus, Medicis' marking of its competing products pursuant to § 287(a) [was] not a circumstance
which supports finding an imminent threat of harm sufficient to create an actual controversy.
Id. at 1340-41.
153. Id. at 1341. In particular, Prasco alleged that Medicis' prior "infringement suit against Prasco and
another generic company . . . demonstrate[d] a genuine risk that the defendants [would] also attempt to
enforce its patents against Prasco." Id. The Federal Circuit recognized that "[p]rior litigious conduct is one
circumstance to be considered in assessing whether the totality of circumstances creates an actual controversy."
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Federal Circuit rejected Prasco's assertions regarding the impact of "Medicis' and
Imaginative Research Associates' failure to sign covenants not to sue after Prasco
54
T
sent them samples of OSCION M in the wake of their initial motion to dismiss.'
K. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.
On September 4, 2008, in Janssen Pharmaceutica,N.V.v. Apotex, Inc.,'" the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Apotex's suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that its ANDA to generic risperidone did not infringe U.S. Patent No.
4,804,663, which relates to Janssen's antipsychotic drug, Risperdal® Oral Solution.1 6 The Federal Circuit held that "Apotex's inability to promptly launch its
generic risperidone product because of Teva's 180-day exclusivity period [was] not
a cognizable Article III controversy, but a result envisioned by the Hatch-Waxman
Act."'5 7 The Federal Circuit held that "a possible delay in the future of a first Paragraph IV ANDA filer in launching its generic product [did] not give rise to declara-

Id. However, the Federal Circuit concluded that "one prior suit concerning different products covered by unrelated patents [was] not the type of pattern of prior conduct that [made] reasonable an assumption that Medicis
[would] also take action against Prasco regarding its new product." Id. (citing Indium Corp. of Am. v. SemiAlloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that "Medicis' prior suit
premised on other patents [could not] alone create a real and immediate controversy, and it [was] entitled to
only minimal weight in analyzing whether such a controversy [had] been created." Id.
154. Id. The Federal Circuit explained that
"although a patentee's refusal to give assurances that it will not enforce its patent is relevant to the
determination, it is not dispositive." A patentee has no obligation to spend the time and money to
test a competitors' product nor to make a definitive determination, at the time and place of the
competitors' choosing, that it will never bring an infringement suit. And the patentee's silence does
not alone make an infringement action or other interference with the plaintiffs business imminent.
Thus, though a defendant's failure to sign a covenant not to sue is one circumstance to consider in
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, it is not sufficient to create an actual controversy-some
affirmative action[ I by the defendant will also generally be necessary.
Id. (quoting BP Chems. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
155. 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
156. Id. at 1355, 1357.
157. Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit understood that "[wlithout a declaratory judgment, Teva's 180-day
exclusivity period" (as the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer) would "commence when it commercially launche[d]
its generic risperidone product after the expiration of the '663 patent." Id. at 1359-60.
However, if Apotex [was] successful on its declaratory judgment action, Teva's 180-day exclusivity
period [would] be triggered at a time [before] Teva [would] be [ ]able to launch its generic product,
•..[and i]f Teva's 180-day exclusivity period [was] exhausted prior to the expiration of the '663
patent, Apotex [would] be able to enter the market immediately upon the expiration of the '663
patent.
Id. at 1360. The Federal Circuit stressed that
Apotex stipulated to the validity, infringement, and enforceability of the '663 patent ....[and] even if
Apotex successfully invalidated the '425 and '527 patents, it [could not] obtain FDA approval until
the expiration of the '663 patent because of its stipulations with respect to that patent ....Instead,
...Apotex [was merely] being excluded from the market by Teva's 180-day exclusivity period-a
period which Teva was entitled to under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Id. at 1361.
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tory judgment jurisdiction."'' 8 Lastly, the Federal Circuit rejected Apotex's
argument "that Janssen's covenant-not-to-sue [was] deficient59 as it [did] not protect
Apotex's affiliates, suppliers, and downstream customers.'
L.

Prudent Business Practicesfor Licensors Post-MedImmune

Among the possible prudent business practices for licensors in the post-Medimmune era would be changes to pre-existing license terms. 6' This could include the
automatic termination of the patent license upon the initiation of any invalidity
challenge by the licensee.' 6' A dispute situs provision in favor of arbitration or
adjudication in a particular district court should also be considered.'62 To offset a
forum selection race, the license could require the licensee to provide advanced
notice prior to the initiation of any invalidity challenge. 6 ' Of course, enhanced
royalty triggers, front loaded royalty payments, and licensee responsibility for licensor litigation insurance premiums are all possible actions that licensors might
implement.' 64
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES PATENT EXHAUSTION IN QUANTA
COMPUTER, INC. V. LG ELECTRONICS, INC.

On June 9, 2008, in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 6 ' the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit judgment that affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part the district court's summary judgment that the defendants did not
infringe U.S. Patents No. 4,918,645, No. 5,077,733, and No. 4,939,641, which relate
to personal computers, based on the doctrine of patent exhaustion. 6 6 The Court
158. Id. at 1363. "Apotex argue[d] that absent a declaratory judgment action, its approval of its noninfringing generic risperidone product [would] be indefinitely delayed until Teva's 180-day exclusivity period [was]
triggered." Id. at 1362. But the Federal Circuit found no "basis to conclude that Teva [would], or [was] likely to,
delay in bringing its generic product to market in the future." Id. at 1363.
159. Id. The Federal Circuit found that the covenant "expressly cover[ed] all suppliers and affiliates involved
in the manufacturing process.... [and] protect[ed] all of Apotex's customers without any distinction between
direct and downstream customers." Id. (internal citations omitted).
160. See Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence:Toward a Better Standardfor Evaluating PatentLitigants' Access to
the DeclaratoryJudgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 442 (2007) ("What seems apparent is that the number
of patent declaratory judgment challenges will increase in the wake of the Medlmmune decision. First, some
licensees will likely seek to undo, or at least renegotiate, existing licenses which lack provisions that proscribe or
discourage validity challenges.").
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., id.
164. See Sean O'Connor, Using Stock & Stock Options to Minimize Patent Royalty Payment Risks After
Medlmmune v. Genentech, 3 N.Y.U. J.L.
& Bus. 381, 451 (2007) ("One easy sounding response to the licensor's
problem created by Medlmmune is that licensors must simply demand all of the expected life time value of the
patent license up front.").
165. 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).
166. Id. at 2113.
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reminded that "patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item. "167
The Court stated that "the right to vend is exhausted by a single, unconditional
sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside the monopoly of the patent law
and rendered free of every restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon
it."' 68 According to the Court,

where one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it embodies essential
features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his patent, and
has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the
patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that
particulararticle.169
The Court further noted that "the traditional bar on patent restrictions following
the sale of an item applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent-even if
it does not completely practice the patent-such that its only and intended use is to
be finished under the terms of the patent. "170
While LG Electronics (LGE) argued that exhaustion principles did not apply to
method claims, such as the ones here, Quanta responded that no authority supported the exclusion of method claims from the doctrine's purview. 7 ' The Court
concurred with Quanta that if LGE's position were adopted, a clever patent drafter
"could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.'17 In the Court's
view, "[t]his case illustrate[d] the danger of allowing such an end run around exhaustion. On LGE's theory, although Intel [was] authorized to sell a completed
computer system that practice[d] the LGE Patents, any downstream purchasers of
the system could nonetheless be liable for patent infringement."'73 The Court recognized that "[s] uch a result would violate the longstanding principle that, when a
patented item is 'once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to
be implied for the benefit of the patentee.'"'" The Court therefore rejected "LGE's
argument that method claims, as a category, are never exhaustible."' 75
The Court "next consider[ed] the extent to which a product must embody a
patent in order to trigger exhaustion."' 76 "Here, LGE ...suggested no reasonable
167. Id. at 2115.
168. Id. at 2116 (quoting Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id. at 2116-17 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. at 2117.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2118.
173. Id.
174. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
453, 457 (1873)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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use for the Intel Products other than incorporating them into computer systems
that practice the LGE Patents."' 77 The Court also could not "discern one: A
microprocessor or chipset cannot function until it is connected to buses and memory."'78 The Court indicated that "the only apparent object of Intel's sales to
Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate the Intel Products into computers
that would practice the patents.""' In the Court's view, "the Intel Products constitute[d] a material part of the patented invention and all but completely practice[d]
the patent .... the incomplete article substantially embodie(d] the patent because
the only step necessary to practice the patent [was] the application of common
processes or the addition of standard parts."' 8 °
The Intel Products embod[ied] the essential features of the LGE Patents because they carr[ied] out all the inventive processes when combined, according
to their design, with standard components. With regard to LGE's argument
that exhaustion does not apply across patents, [the Court] agree[d] on the
general principle: the sale of a device that practicespatentA does not, by virtue
of practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device practices patent A
while substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does not
prevent exhaustion of patent B.' 8 '
The Court determined that "[w]hile each Intel microprocessor and chipset practice[d] thousands of individual patents, including some LGE patents not at issue in
this case, the exhaustion analysis [was] not altered by the fact that more than one
patent [was] practiced by the same product." 82 According to the Court, "[t]he relevant consideration [was] whether the Intel Products that partially practice[d] a
patent-by, for example, embodying its essential features-exhausted that
'
patent." 83
"Having concluded that the Intel Products embodied the patents, [the Court]
next considere[d] whether their sale to Quanta exhausted LGE's patent rights. Exhaustion is triggered only by a sale authorized by the patent holder," the Court
reminded.'84 "LGE argue[d] that there was no authorized sale here because the License Agreement [did] not permit Intel to sell its products for use in combination
with non-Intel products to practice the LGE Patents."' 88 The Court reasoned that

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 2119.

at 2120.
at 2121.
(citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942)).
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LGE overlook[ed] important aspects of the structure of the Intel-LGE transaction. [Indeed, niothing in the License Agreement restrict[ed]Intel's right to sell
its microprocessors and chipsets to purchaserswho intend[ed] to combine them
with non-Intel parts....

The License Agreement authorized Intel to sell prod-

ucts that practiced the LGE Patents. No conditions limited Intel's authority to
sell products substantially embodying the patents. Because Intel was authorized
to sell its products to Quanta, the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevent[ed]
LGEfrom further asserting its patent rights with respect to the patents substantially embodied by those products.'86

VII.

POST-QUANTA

RESULTS REGARDING PATENT EXHAUSTION

Since Quanta, the Federal Circuit has not issued any precedential decisions addressing patent exhaustion per se. However, the Federal Circuit has considered an appeal
on jurisdictional issues involving the impropriety of the assertion of patent exhaustion as a bona fide cause of action. 7
A.

ExcelStor Technology, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co.

On September 16, 2008, in ExcelStor Technology, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH &
Co., "88
' the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction over ExcelStor's fraud and breach of contract suit against Papst,
which included a count seeking a declaratory judgment that Papst had violated the
patent exhaustion or first sale doctrine by collecting two royalties from the sale of
the same patented hard disk drives. 9 The Federal Circuit rejected ExcelStor's contention that its claims arose under the patent exhaustion doctrine of patent law,
and thus, were subject to federal court jurisdiction. 90 But the Federal Circuit deter186. Id. at 2121-22.
187. See ExcelStor Tech., Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co., 541 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1374.
190. Id. at 1376. A two-part test exists
for determining whether federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) ....
[Section] 1338 jurisdiction extends to any case "in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is
a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims."
Id. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (2005)). "In analyzing whether
patent law is a necessary element of ExcelStor's claims," the Federal Circuit confined its analysis to "ExcelStor's
well-pleaded complaint." Id. (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). "Under the wellpleaded complaint rule, arising under jurisdiction must be determined from what necessarily appears in the
plaintiffs statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or
avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Christianson,486 U.S. at 809). "A claim does not arise under the patent laws if a patent issue appears
only in a defense to that claim." Id. (citing Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 471 F.3d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
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mined that ExcelStor's claims did "not 'arise under' the patent laws" because they
"merely invoke[d] defenses to hypothetical claims of patent infringement."'' The
Federal Circuit thus held that "ExcelStor's claims [did] not establish federal subject
matter jurisdiction because they [did] not require resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law."192
B.

Other Post-Quanta Consequences

Among the possible prudent business practices for patent owners in the postQuanta era would be the imposition of express post-sale restrictions on downstream product use.'93 In addition, in view of the Supreme Court's willingness to

find exhaustion of a patent based on the sale of a patented product so long as that
product embodies the essential features of a patent, the assessment of the exhaustion implications on each member of a related patent family is warranted.'94 This is
especially true where the product being sold represents the integration of components, any of which might be characterized as a material part of the patented invention. 9 Lastly, the adoption of a patent prosecution strategy to craft distinct
method claims to encompass end user finishing steps might help alleviate exhaustion concerns.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit jurisprudence in the wake of reinvigorated Supreme Court activity in patent appeals has revealed several direct consequences. The Federal Circuit decisions that have issued in response to eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 9 6
have included the approval of injunctive relief in the form of post-infringement
verdict royalties amounting to a compulsory license.' 97 The Federal Circuit deci-

191. Id. (quoting Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809). The Federal Circuit characterized ExcelStor's argument
that patent law created the cause of action in this case as a "fundamental[ I misunderstand[ing of] the nature of
the patent exhaustion doctrine." Id. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling that "patent
exhaustion [was] a defense to patent infringement, not a cause of action." Id.
192. Id. "The exhaustion doctrine prohibits patent holders from selling a patented article and then 'invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the article.'" Id. (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.
128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008)). The Federal Circuit determined that "ExcelStor's amended complaint [did] not
allege that Papst invoked the patent laws to control the post-sale use of the hard disk drives." Id. Instead,
"ExcelStor ... allege[d] that Papst violated the patent exhaustion doctrine by collecting two different royalties
from the same patented product." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). But the Federal Circuit
emphasized that "there is no federal cause of action for collecting royalties twice on the same goods." Id. at
1376-77. The Federal Circuit reminded that "[platent exhaustion prohibits patentees from enforcing patent
rights in certain circumstances, but it does not forbid multiple licenses on a single product or even multiple
royalties." Id. at 1377.
193. See Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta, Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
682, 682 (2008) (discussing patentee rights to control post-sale transfer).
194. See id. at 691.
195. See id.
196. See supra Part II.
197. See supra Part Ill.
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sions that have issued in response to MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.'98 have
included the caution to more rigorously consider 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to facilitate the
transfer of cases to the most appropriate forum despite the first-filed rule.'99 In
addition, an enhanced attention to the scope of covenants not to sue to remove
Article III controversy jurisdiction should arise. 20 Lastly, the Federal Circuit decisions that have issued since Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.2"' have yet
to address the heart of the Supreme Court's holding on patent exhaustion.2 °2 One
can expect nonetheless that the Federal Circuit will soon entertain appeals from
district court cases involving attempts to privately order patent rights through assignment and licenses that will have implications for third parties as well as those
in contract privity. At bottom, there is a multiplicity of issues that the Supreme
Court has generated with its reinvigorated activity in patent appeals that should
readily allow us to continue to live in interesting times.
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